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The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically for the years 1980-88 the factors 
which led states with state income taxes to run tax amnesty programs. We find a 
principal factor to be the level of IRS auditing; in particular, we find that states have 
tended to "free-ride" on the IRS-if the IRS is active in a state, then that state is less 
likely to run a tax amnesty program. Indeed, our estimates indicate that had the IRS 
audit rate remained constant during the 1980-88 period (instead of falling by almost
one-half) , then the cummulative probability that an average state would have a tax 
amnesty by 1988 would have fallen by almost one-half compared to its actual level. 
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1 Introduction
Between December 1981 and December 1989, 27 states with state income taxes offered 
some form of tax amnesty program that included income taxes. 1 Another state
(Virginia) had a tax amnesty program from February 1, 1990 through March 31, 1990.
Two states (Illinois and Louisiana) have each conducted two tax amnesty programs.
The dates for state tax amnesty programs which have included income taxes, 2 their
gross revenues and coverage characteristics are shown in Table 1. 
Gross revenues from state tax amnesty programs have ranged from lows of $150,000 
and $280,000 for North Dakota and Louisiana, respectively, to highs of $182 million 
and $401 million for New Jersey and New York, respectively. All of the programs 
included nonfilers but varied concerning whether taxpayers with delinquent accounts 
or taxpayers who filed returns but underreported their taxes were eligible. The earliest 
five state tax amnesty programs covered nonfilers only. 
Despite the fact that 28 of the 40 states with nontrivial state income taxes have 
now run tax amnesty programs, the efficacy of such programs remains uncertain. Con­
troversy also surrounds proposals for a federal income tax amnesty (Leonard and Zeck­
hauser, 1987). One reason for these controversies is that no one has yet analyzed 
empirically, even in modestly sophisticated ways, the factors that have caused states 
to run tax amnesty programs, the reasons why taxpayers participate in them, or the 
future consequences of the programs either in terms of the number of returns filed or 
total revenue collected. 
There is a corresponding dearth of theoretical analysis, although some work has 
occurred, notably by Alm and Beck (1986) , Andreoni (1988) and Malik and Schwab 
(1988), dealing with the participation in amnesties by underreporters. All of these 
authors consider the revenue impacts of amnesties, but none focus their theoretical 
analysis on identifying the factors which might increase the likelihood that a given 
state would decide to initiate a tax amnesty program. 
Alm and Beck analyze empirically (for the calendar years 1982-85) those aspects
of state tax amnesty programs which tend to affect gross amnesty revenues. Their 
analysis identifies two features as important: the participation of known delinquents, 
1 Ala.ska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Wa.shiugton and Wyomiug have no state income tax. 
Connecticut taxes only interest, dividends and capital gains, while Tennessee and New Hampshire tax 
only interest and dividends. 
2Texas and Florida also have run tax amnesty programs, but these states do not have income taxes. 
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i.e., the inclusion of accounts receivable, and the coupling of increased enforcement
efforts to the amnesty program. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically for calendar and fiscal years 
1980-88 the factors which led states with state income taxes to run tax amnesty pro­
grams.3 We find a principal factor to be the level of IRS auditing; in particular, we find 
that states have tended to "free-ride" on the IRS-if the IRS is active in a state, then 
that state is less likely to run a tax amnesty program. Indeed, our estimates indicate 
that had the IRS audit rate remained constant during the 1980-88 period (instead
of falling by almost one-half) , then the cumulative probability that an average state
would have a tax amnesty by 1988 would have fallen by almost one-half compared to 
its actual level. 
In Section 2 we review the relevant literature, concentrating on the characteristics 
of state tax amnesty participants and the perceived benefits of state tax amnesties to 
states. We next develop a discrete-time-duration model of amnesties in Section 3. 
In Section 4, drawing upon the discussion in Section 2, we specify and estimate our 
duration model and in Section 5 we discuss the results obtained from it. We conclude 
in Section 6 with some brief speculations on the policy implications of our results. 
2 The Objectives of Amnesties and Characteristics
of Amnesty Participants 
In the most comprehensive published review of state tax amnesty programs, Ross iden­
tifies four goals of tax amnesty programs: "(1) place additional taxpayers on the tax 
rolls and improve future compliance; (2) speed up collections and produce a short­
term revenue windfall; (3) create data concerning patterns of taxpayer noncompliance 
and identify specific areas where enforcement reforms are necessary; and (4) act as a 
lightening rod to attract public attention around programs to increase enforcement." 
(1986, p. 152). Ross reports that "[m]ost state officials said that the primary goals of
. . .  amnesty programs were prospective: to get taxpayers back on the tax rolls, and to 
improve future compliance,'' the latter in part by "publiciz[ing] increased enforcement
mechanisms that were to go into effect immediately after their amnesty periods." 
Leonard and Zeckhauser (1987) identify four benefits and three costs of tax amnesties. 
The benefits are: (1) reduction in the guilt of evaders (they treat guilt as a deadweight
loss) ; (2) increase in revenue from voluntary tax payments; (3) addition of former delin­
quents to the tax rolls; and ( 4) smoothing the transition to a regime of stricter tax law 
enforcement. The costs are: (1) increased feelings by honest taxpayers that the tax 
system is unfair; (2) encouragement of future noncompliance (due to the anticipation
of future amnesties) and (3) reduction in the sense that tax evasion is wrong.
3Such an analysis is not only logically antecedent to the investigation of the consequences of running 
state tax a1n.:nesties, it is required of any such investigation. This is because a proper empirical analysis 
of the gross revenue due and attributable to state amnesties must account for the self-selection of states 
in choosing to initiate an amnesty program. 
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Fisher, Goddeeris and Young, in a review of six large state tax amnesty programs 
(California, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan and New York) , identify three pri­
mary characteristics of tax amnesty programs: (1) "The individual income tax accounts 
for the majority of tax evasion cases resolved through amnesty programs;" (2) "most of 
the . . .  cases . . .  involve small payments, often less than $100;" and (3) "not having filed 
(rather than having filed incorrectly) is the common form of evasion among amnesty
participants." (1989, p. 18). 
Finally, as noted in the introduction to this paper, Alm and Beck (1986) analyze 
empirically the effects of various features of state tax amnesty programs on the direct 
revenue attributed to those programs, identifying the participation of known delin­
quents and greater funding for post-amnesty enforcement as the two key features.4 
Based on these studies, states seem to have initiated tax amnesty programs to 
accomplish the dual goals of increasing revenues and decreasing noncompliance. A 
desire for more revenue is straightforward and needs little further discussion. In terms 
of specification of an empirical model, it leads directly to the consideration of variables 
related to a state's fiscal "health" ;  e.g., state tax revenue, federal subsidies, and long­
term debt-and to variables related to the potential yield from an amnesty-per capita 
income, unemployment, and, again, state tax revenue. On the other hand, the desire by 
states for decreased noncompliance merits some further discussion, especially in terms 
of its connection to federal enforcement efforts. 
There is a direct linkage between the activities of state and federal tax agencies. 
Congress and state legislatures have explidtly provided for exchanges of otherwise con­
fidential tax return and other tax information between the states and the IRS "to 
increase tax revenues and taxpayer compliance and reduce duplicate resource expen­
ditures."5 Agreements on the exchange of tax information also explicitly provide that 
state tax enforcement agencies and the IRS "will develop cooperative return selection 
and examination programs" to avoid duplicative efforts.6 The IRS and cooperative 
states now routinely, for example, synchronize certain audit decisions. Currently 49 
states and the District of Columbia have agreements on the coordination of tax infor­
mation and audits with the IRS. 
Many states, however, rely almost exclusively on the IRS for enforcement of state 
income taxes. As Snavely summarized as recently as 1988, "it is likely that in most 
states the bulk of audits come from returns in which information is obviously missing 
or false claims are evident and from cases in which federal claims have been made 
against a state's citizens" (Snavely, 1988, p. 908) . Indeed, Kansas and Pennsylvania, for
example, do virtually no auditing at all while Colorado, Hawaii, Louisiana, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, and West Virginia depend almost entirely 
on information provided by the IRS in conducting state income tax audits (Dubin,
4Leonard and Zeckhauser (1987) also consider the indirect consequences of tax amnesties in terms of
the effects of such programs on revenue growth. However, while they find that states which have had 
ta.x amnesties experience greater revenue grov:th than those that have not, they do not control for any 
other factors besides the existence of an amnesty program. 
5Internal Revenue Service Manual, Disclosure of Information Handbook, §(33) 00. 
6Id. at Exhibit (33) 00-1, Section 5.1 (Draft Agreement on Coordination of Tax Administration) .
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Graetz, and Wilde, 1989a).
But IRS audit rates have fallen dramatically over the last decade from roughly two 
percent to about one percent (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde, 1989c). This decline has
had significant effects on many state tax enforcement programs. In terms of model 
specification, the fall in federal audit rates coupled with the general reliance of states 
on information provided by the IRS suggests the consideration of variables related to 
the IRS's enforcement activities within a state-in particular, the IRS audit rate. 
In the next section, before specifying our empirical models, we describe our econo­
metric approach. In general, we attempt to define the probability that a state which 
has not initiated an amnesty does so, conditional on its past experiences, its economic 
characteristics, and related IRS activities. In Section 4 we specify the equations we 
estimate, discussing in more detail the variables used in those equations. 
3 A Discrete-Time Duration Model
In this section we describe the econometric approach that is used to estimate the length 
of time states wait before initiating a tax amnesty. The econometric model we employ 
is a discrete-time-duration model with normally distributed hazards. 
In each period we classify the states according to their participation status: partic­
ipating in a tax-amnesty program or not yet participating. We specify the probability 
that a state which has not initiated an amnesty does initiate such a program as condi­
tional on its past experience, its economic characteristics and other factors which may 
affect the attractiveness of amnesties. 
Let Yit denote the participation status of state i in period t:
{ 0 if not participating during period t; Yit = 1 if state initiates an amnesty during period t.
The conditional probability that after t - 1 periods of nonparticipation the state 
begins an amnesty program in period t, sometimes called the "escape probability," is 
given by 
Pit - Pr(yit = l IY•1 = · · · = Y•.t-1 = O, X;t) 
<P('y'x.,), 
where Xit is a vector of characteristics thought to be related to the probability of
initiating an amnesty and iP ( ·) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function.
The probability that a state which has not initiated an amnesty up to period t fails to 
initiate an amnesty in that period is 1 - P;t. 
For each state we calculate the number of years that have transpired without any 
amnesty program and denote this by T;. The waiting time T; takes on a maximum value 
of nine years in our data and we record any state that has waited longer than nine years 
as a "censored" observation. Censoring occurs because the panel is of fixed length so 
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that the length of time before a state initiates an amnesty cannot be determined for 
all states at the end of the sampling period. 
Let c; denote the state's status after T; - 1 periods of nonparticipation:
{ 0 if state has an amnesty c; = 1 if state does not have an amnesty.
Observations for which c; = 1 are censored, as the observed duration T; does not
represent a completed spell. The treatment of censoring is of some importance in the 
modeling of amnesty decisions as fourteen of the 40 states which have nontrivial state 
income taxes did not initiate an amnesty in the nine years for which we have data.7 
It follows that the conditional probability of observing a spell of length T; which is 
either complete (c; = 0) or censored (c; = 1) is:
Ti-1 
L;(T;, c;) = Pt;,';(1- P;,TJ•; II (1 - P;1). (1) 
t=l 
From (1) we form the log likelihood for the full sample: L = E�1logL;(T;,c;). Maxi­
mizing L with respect to the unknown parameter "/ yields consistent and asymptotically 
normal estimates; optimization is undertaken using a Newton-Raphson algorithm with 
optimal step size. 8 
Once the parameters have been estimated it is straightforward to obtain an estimate 
of the expected amount of time states will spend without participating in amnesty 
programs and the cumulative probability of initiating an amnesty as a function of the 
duration of time without an amnesty program. The probability of initiating an amnesty 
program in period s after s - 1 periods without an amnesty program is given by:
s-1 
Q;(s) = P;, IT (1 - Pit), (2) t=l 
so that the expected length of time state i will wait is: 
00 
E(T;jc; = 0) =I: sQ;(s). (3) 
s=I 
Before estimating the escape probability for amnesties, Pit, it is useful to consider
the importance of censoring on the estimated duration time. Consider the form of 
equation (1) when the escape probability Pit is a constant P. The sample likelihood
becomes: 
N N Ti-1 N 
L = II L;(T;, c;) = II pl-c;(l - P)•; II (1 - P) = II pl-c;(l - pr;+•;-1. (4) 
i=l i=l i=l 
7tv'1./e esthna.te our n1odel for the years 1980-88. t{orth Carolina, in fact, ran a tax amnesty in 1989 
but we cannot use this information since we do not have the necessary socio-economic factors for 1989. 
8Estimation is performed within the Statistical Software Tools econometric package. See Dubin and 
Rivers (1988). 
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Maximizing L with respect to the unknown probability P gives PML = (1- C)/D
where C = iv 2=�1 C; is the percentage of cases which are censored and D = iv 2=�1 T; 
is the average duration of observed waiting time in the sample. Since the expected 
waiting time is, in this case, the reciprocal of the escape probability, the effect of 
censoring is to increase the estimate of expected waiting time by the reciprocal of the 
percentage of cases which are not censored. 
In our sample the fraction of censored cases is 14/40. The sample average duration 
of observed waiting time is iv 2=T; = 257 /40. Thus, the escape probability is estimated
to be 0.101 and corresponds to an expected waiting time of 257 /26 - roughly ten 
years. We do not expect the conditional escape probabilities to be constant either 
across states or in time. The estimated duration models considered below contain the 
constant probability specification as a special case. As we shall see, these models are 
rejected at the usual levels of statistical significance in favor of other specifications that 
allow covariates. 9 
4 Specification and Estimation
We begin with the specification of the escape probability. The escape probability is 
assumed to be a function of the unemployment rate, personal income per capita, the 
percentage change in real income tax collections from the previous year and the rate of 
IRS auditing of individual tax returns. The unemployment rate and per capita income 
are related to both revenue and compliance, the percentage change in real income tax 
collection is related primarily to revenue, and the IRS audit rate is related primarily 
to compliance. 
The potential relationship between the unemployment rate and state income tax 
amnesties is complex. First, states with higher unemployment rates may have un­
sound economies and thus an amnesty in such a state would produce less revenue. 
This suggests a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the likeli­
hood of an amnesty. Second, as indicated in Section 2 above, all amnesty programs 
include nonfilers, many exclusively so, and the number of nonfilers should increase as 
the unemployment rate rises. This suggests a positive relationship between the unem­
ployment rate and the likelihood of an amnesty. Third, if unemployment is associated 
with the so-called "underground economy" generally, then states with higher unem­
ployment rates should have greater noncompliance problems. Again, this suggests a 
positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the likelihood of an amnesty. 
On net, since the presence of per capita income in our model should mitigate the first 
effect to some extent, we expect a positive relationship between the unemployment rate 
9 An alternative specification for the cumulative rate of adoption of amnesties would be the product 
life-cycle model (Bass, 1969). The product life-cycle model emphasizes the "fad" or "band-wagon"
aspects of the demand for a good of which repeat purchase is uncommon. A basic assumption in these 
models is that the rate of adoption in a given period is proportional to the cumulative activity up to that 
period. It is therefore noteworthy that our empirical approach, which is based on disaggregate data, 
also rejects specifications of the adoption rate which are simple functions of elapsed time. 
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and the likelihood of an amnesty. 
Per capita income potentially has a complex relationship with state income tax 
amnesties as well. First, there is a direct yield effect-states with higher per capita 
income can expect greater revenue generally from a tax amnesty. On the other hand, 
such states may be less likely to be experiencing fiscal stress and thus would be less 
likely to run an amnesty program. Second, states with higher per capita income may 
have more taxpayers above the minimum income level required for filing, and thus might 
expect more nonfilers to participate in an amnesty. Third, higher income generally is 
associated with increased opportunities to evade taxes, and thus states with higher per 
capita income may have more serious compliance problems. All of these factors except 
the fiscal stress effect suggest a positive relationship between per capita income and 
the likelihood of an amnesty. 
The percentage change in state income tax collections provides an ideal test of the 
yield hypothesis versus the fiscal stress hypothesis; i.e., between the hypothesis that 
states with a solid revenue base are more likely to have an amnesty and the hypothesis 
that states experiencing fiscal stress are more likely to have an amnesty. A positive 
relationship between the percentage change in state income tax collections and the 
likelihood of an amnesty supports the yield hypothesis, while a negative relationship 
supports the fiscal stress hypothesis. 
Finally, we include the federal audit rate of individual returns. This variable simul­
taneously captures noncompliance and free-riding. On one hand, states with higher 
federal audit· rates might have cornpliance problems that are known to the IRS. This 
perception could lead a state to initiate its own amnesty program to combat the non­
compliance. On the other hand, states where auditing is high benefit from the presence 
of the federal government with respect to their attempts to enforce tax compliance. 
Such states may view federal enforcement efforts as a cheap alternative to their own 
enforcement efforts and may thus eschew amnesty programs on the grounds that they 
are both costly and unnecessary. 
Among these factors, the role of audits is perhaps the most complicated. An un­
observed effect such as greater noncompliance in a state may increase or decrease the 
state's propensity to initiate an amnesty program. Concurrently, the IRS is likely to 
respond to the compliance problem and increase its audit rate. To determine which 
effect (free-riding or directly combatting noncompliance) dominates a state's decision
to initiate participation in an amnesty program requires that the simultaneous determi­
nation of audit rates and durations be explicitly recognized in the econometric analysis. 
In this regard, let 
(5) 
denote the latent variable for the escape event (initiate an amnesty) in period t for state
i. This unobserved measure is a function of state specific exogenous characteristics (xrn)
and the potentially endogenous audit level (Y2it)· We observe the outcome:
. _ { 1 if Yrit > O (initiate an amnesty in period t)Yi.t - 0 otherwise (waits at least another period) . 
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(6) 
The audit rate is specified by a reduced form 
I ' II+ 'Y2it = X2it 2 l/2it (7) 
where x2;1 is a vector of state and time varying characteristics which affect the level of 
auditing. The econometric difficulty is that the probit specification for the conditional 
hazard as represented by equations (1) and (2) contains the potentially endogenous
regressor y2;1• While several solutions to this problem have been proposed (see e.g.,
Rivers and Vuong, 1988 for a summary) , we follow the approach outlined by Smith and
Blundell (1986) .
Smith and Blundell demonstrate that consistent estimates of the parameters 81 and 
(31 in the structural equation may be obtained if the estimated residuals from equation
(7) are included as additional regressors in the probit function. To obtain consistent 
estimates we therefore specify 
h •f I I rr• w ere V2it = Y2it - X2it 2 ·
(8) 
As demonstrated by Rivers and Vuong (1988) , this procedure does not attain the
Cramer-Rao lower bound that is achievable using a limited information maximum 
likelihood estimator, but it has the advantage of computational simplicity and provides 
a direct test for the endogeneity of Y�it in the structural equation. Specificaiiy, the
endogeneity of Y�it in the prob it hazard ( 4) is equivalent to the rejection of the null
hypothesis that the coefficients a are zero.10 
The reduced form estimates for the audit equation are adapted from earlier work 
of our own (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde, 1989b) . We take the audit individual rate to
be a function of education (ED) , age (PER45) , unemployment (UR) , per capita real
income (PI CAP) , percent employed in manufacturing (PMAN) , percent employed in
service (PSERV) , average state tax rates (STAXR) , IRS budget levels (BPR) , and time
(TIME) .11
The definitions and sources of these variables (as well as the others used in the
duration model) are given in Table 2. We provide mean values of the variables for each
of the nine years (1980-1988) for which we have data in Table 3. The means are taken
across the 50 states and tabulated by year. 
10 Another method to estimate the parameters of the duration model, would be to substitute the 
reduced-form for Y�it into the equation for y�it· This method is computationally more exacting and
does not provide any simple test for the endogeneity for Y�it· A procedure equivalent to that employed
by Smith and Blundell (1986) or Lee (1981) , (jointly termed the instrumental variables probit (IVP)
method) is to substitute the predicted value �it rather than the residuals v;it into the equations for Yri·
This method requires that the coefficients of y;it and y;it be summed to obtain the consistent estimate
for 5,. 
11 For a detailed discussion of this specification see Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1989b) .
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5 Results 
Table 4 presents the estimated reduced form equation for the audit rates, which has 
a corrected R-squared of 0. 75.12 The audit rate increases with education, the percent 
employed in a service industry and with the budget available to the IRS. It decreases 
with the percentage of the population between 45 and 60 years of age, personal income 
per capita, the percentage employed in a manufacturing industry, and with time. While 
these results are for the most part plausible, (audits generally respond to opportunities 
to evade yet are constrained by the funds that make them possible), we resist the 
temptation to interpret these reduced form results as structural effects.13. 
Having reduced form estimates for the audit rate, we can proceed to the estimation 
of the duration models. In Table 5, we provide sample means for the explanatory 
variables used in the formulation of the escape probabilities. We should note that this 
table is based on a subset of the 40 states who have some significant state income tax 
program (as are the estimated duration models) . It is clearly not appropriate to model 
the length of time elapsed before a state initiates an amnesty for any state that is ruled 
out a priori from conducting such a program. 
The duration models are based on 360 observations {40 states over nine years) . 
We have calculated the length of time each states waits before it initiates an amnesty 
and we record this length on both a fiscal and calendar year basis. We display this 
information in Table 6. Our working assumption is that durations are measured relative 
to 1980. We use 1980 as a starting point since the first state in out sarnple to conduct 
a tax amnesty was Illinois and this amnesty occurred in calendar year 1981. We record 
this in the table as a one year duration event. 
The estimated duration models are presented in Table 7. The results are given for 
six models. The first three are based on calendar year lengths and the second three 
models are based on fiscal year lengths. Within each set we estimate first the constant 
probability model, the model without correction for endogeneity of audits, and the 
endogeneity corrected model. 
The constant probability models agree with the calculations presented above. The 
constant escape probability is estimated by Model 4 to be \P{-1.27) = 0.102. However, 
this model is rejected by the unrestricted model with covariates. In Model 6 for example 
the log-likelihood is -75.69. The likelihood-ratio test which compares this value against 
the -83.446 that attains in the constant probability model has a value of 15.5 which 
exceed the 95 percent critical value of the chi-squared with 5 degrees of freedom 11.1. 
The audit rate affect is not significant in the models which are unadjusted for 
endogeneity {Models 2 and 5). However, once endogeneity is taken into account the 
12Following Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1989b) , we assume that the error term in the reduced form
equation contains a state specific random effect which causes dependence in the reduced form residuals. 
The estimates of the reduced form coefficients use generalized least squares to correct for this correlation. 
We do this to provide correct standard errors for the estimated effects in the reduced form audit equation. 
It is worth noting, however, that consistent estimation of the duration model only requires consistent 
(not necessarily efficient) estimates of the reduced form audit estimated residuals.
13 Again, for a more complete discussion see Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1989b) 
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audit rate is seen to be negative and significant (t---statistics of approximately 1.9).
We therefore find that the federal audit rate is endogenous in the duration models 
and that its consistent effect is negative. An increase in the audit rate leads states 
to wait longer before initiating a tax amnesty (the escape rate in any period declines)
and thus the hypothesis of states free-riding is accepted-or at least dominates the 
behavior of the states vis-a-vis their own intentions regarding noncompliance. 
Given that the log-likelihoods in Models 3 and 6 are so similar, we do not discern 
any differences arising from the two methods of measuring the length of time elapsed 
before a state initiates an amnesty. In the discussion which follows we use the fiscal 
based specification given in Model 6 for convenience. 
The estimated effects in Model 6 are generally in accord with our expectations. An 
increase in unemployment increases the likelihood of an amnesty as does an increase in 
per capita income. 
Finally, the fiscal stress variable, PSTAX, which measures the percentage change in 
state tax revenue, has a coefficient which is only margina!ly significant and positive. If 
this result is credited as being significant then we find that states for which real state 
tax collections are increasing are more likely to initiate amnesties, thus supporting the 
yield hypothesis as opposed to the fiscal stress hypothesis. 
To further check the validity of this last result we attempted to measure fiscal 
stress in a variety of alternative ways. We investigated specifications which included 
the ratio of state incorne tax to other revenue sources, the percentage char1ge in this 
latter variable over time, the percentage change in nonsfate tax revenue, and alternative 
methods for inflation adjustment. All of these avenues were similar in that we could 
not find, in our data, any support for a fiscal stress theory of amnesties.14 
To illustrate how our model fits the actual experience of the states we have calcu­
lated the cumulative percentage of states which had adopted an amnesty program at a 
given point in time and we have compared this to the cumulative escape probability as 
predicted by our estimated duration model. From equation (2), the cumulative escape 
probability after l periods is given by 
l 
L Q;(s) = Pil + (1- P;i)P;2 + (1- P;1)(l - Pi2)P;s s=l 
(9) 
We plot the predicted and actual cumulative adoption rates in Figure 1. Our model fits 
the actual experience of the states (in aggregate) quite well although it somewhat over­
predicts the cumulative adoption rate in the early periods and somewhat underpredicts 
it in the later periods. 
Finally, we can illustrate the important role of audits in contributing to the states 
rate of adoption of amnesty programs. We use the estimated duration model to calcu-
14\-X/hile the level of delinquent accounts is unlikely to explain the probability that a state runs an 
amnesty which does not cover accounts receivable, it may help explain the probability that a state runs 
an amnesty which does cover accounts receivable. Unfortunately, the data needed to test this hypothesis 
is not available now. 
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late the cumulative adoption probabilities under an assumed course of events in which 
the IRS had not lowered the audit rate from its 1980 to 1988 levels. We plot the pre­
dicted cumulative adoption probabilities based on the historical course of audits and 
based on the 1980 audit-level rates in Figure 2. Using the 1980 levels of the audit 
rate shows that states would not have adopted amnesty programs with anywhere near 
the fervor we have witnessed. By the end of the sample period (1988), the cumulative 
adoption percentage would only be about 36% as compared with the actual value of 
approximately 65%. It would therefore appear that a side effect the federal policy of 
diminished audit capability resulted in shifting a substantial enforcement burden onto 
the states, who then found it necessary to substitute their own efforts in place of the 
federal governments. 
6 Conclusion 
While state tax amnesties may have resulted in increased rates of revenue growth for 
those states which ran them (Leonard and Zeckhauser, 1987), it is hard to escape the
conclusion that many states initiated tax amnesties as part of a systematic effort to 
respond to the decade long fall in federal tax enforcement activities. Many, but not all, 
states coupled tax amnesties with increased post-amnesty enforcement efforts of their 
own. At the same time, there is no evidence that states that ran amnesty programs 
were under any "fiscal stress." Indeed, states with high per capita income and high 
growth rates in real state income tax collections were most likely to run tax amnesties, 
perhaps because an amnesty in such states was more likely to generate a high yield. 
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TABLE 1 
History of State Tax Amnesties, Revenues, and Coverage 
t; 
Coverage 
State Time Period Gross Revenue Nonfilers Accounts Receivable Underreporters 
Illinois (# 1) 12-28-81 to .089 yes no no 
1-08-82 
Arizona 11-22-82 to 6.0 yes no no 
1-20-83 
Idaho 5-20-83 to .009 yes no no 
8-30-83., 
Missouri 9-1-83 to .845 yes no no 
10-31-83 
North Dakota 9-01-83 to .15 yes no yes* 
11-30-83 
Massachusetts 10-17-83 to 85.2 yes yes yes 
1-17-84 
Alabama 1C20-84 tO 3.1 yes no yes 
4-1-84 
Kansas 7-01-84 to .6 yes no no 
9-30-84 
Oklahoma 7-01-84 to 17.0 yes yes yes 
12-31-84 
Minnesota 8-01-84 to 12.1 yes yes no 
10-31-84 
Illinois (# 2) 10-1-84 to 158.6 yes yes yes 
11-30-84 
California 12-10-84 to 197.0 yes yes yes 
3-15-85 
New Mexico 8-15-85 to 13.6 yes no yes** 
11-13-85 
South Carolina 9-1-85 to 8.9 yes yes yes 
11-30-85 
* The North Dakota tax amnesty was only open to persons not "under investigation." In principle 
underreporters were included, but only nonfilers participated. 
** Approximately 95% of gross revenue from the New Mexico tax amnesty came from nonfilers. 
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Coverage 
State Time Period Gross Revenue Nonfilers Accounts Receivable Underreporters 
Wisconsin 9-15-85 to 27.3 yes yes yes 
11-22-85 
Colorado 9-16-85 to 6.4 yes no yes 
11-15-85 
Louisiana ( # 1) 10-1-85 to 1.2 yes no no 
12-31-85 
New York 11-01-85 to 401.3 yes yes yes 
1-31-86 
Michigan 5-12-86 to 109.8 yes yes yes 
6-30-86 
Mississippi 9-1-86 to 1.0 yes no yes 
11-30-86 
Iowa 9-02-86 to 35.1 yes yes yes 
10-31-86 
West Virginia 10-01-86 to 10.1 yes yes yes 
12-31-86 
Rhode Island 10-15-86 to 1.9 yes no no 
1-12-86 
Arkansas 9-01-87 to 1.2 yes no yes 
11-30-87 
Maryland 9-01-87 to 34.6 yes yes yes 
11-02-87 
New Jersey 9-10-87 to 182.0 yes yes yes 
12-08-87 
Louisiana (# 2) 10-01-87 to .28 yes no no 
12-15-87 
Kentucky 9-15-88 to 60.1 yes no yes 
12-15-88 
North Carolina 9-1-89 37.6 yes yes yes 
12-01-89 
Virginia 02-01-90 32.3 yes yes yes 
03-31-90 
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CONSTANT 
ED 
PER45 
UR 
PI CAP 
PMAN 
PSERV 
STAXR 
BPR 
IAR 
PST AX 
IARRES 
TIME 
Notes: (1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
TABLE2 
Variable Definitions and Sources1
Constant term 
Percentage of the adult population with at least a high school education2 
Percentage of the adult population between 45 and 60 years of age 
Unemployment rate 
Personal Income per capita in constant (1972) dollars 
Percentage of labor f orce that works in a manuf acturing industry 
Percentage of labor f orce that works in a service industry 
Average state income tax rate3 
Bud§et per return-IRS state level budget divided by the total number of returns 
filed 
Individual Audit Rate-number of individual returns examined divided by the 
number of individual returns filed4 
Percentage change in real state income tax collections3 
Estimated residual f rom reduced form audit equation 
Time trend 
Unless otherwise noted, data is taken from Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1981-1989. 
The percent of the adult population with at least a high school education in 1980 is 
taken from the U.S. Census. For subsequent years we combine data on the number of 
high school graduates with other demographic data to construct projections based on 
the 1980 values. 
Total state income taxes are taken from State Government Tax Collections, 1980-1988, 
published by the U.S. Department of Commerce. We divide this variable by total state 
income, taken from Statistical Abstracts of the U.S., 1981-89, to obtain the average 
state income tax rate. 
Individual returns filed, individual returns examined, IRS state-level budgets, and total 
returns filed are taken from Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
1980-88. 
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Variable<2l
ED 
PER45 
UR 
PI CAP 
PMAN 
PSERV 
STAXR 
BPR 
IAR<3l 
Notes: (1) 
(2) 
(3) 
1980 1981 
.67 .68 
.27 .26 
.068 .073 
5.14 5.24 
.21 .20 
.19 .20 
1.61 1.58 
.0045 .0044 
1.66 1.53 
TABLE 3 
Sample Statistics for Variables in Reduced 
Form Audit Equation1 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
.68 .67 .68 .68 .68 
.26 .25 .25 .25 .25 
.093 .093 .073 .071 .069 
5.20 5.28 5.54 5.75 5.68 
.19 .19 .19 .18 .18 
.21 .21 .21 .22 .22 
1.63 1.70 1.80 1.77 1.75 
.0044 .0048 .0048 .0046 .0042 
1.40 1.36 1.23 1.15 1.00 
Based on all 50 states. 
1987 1988 
.68 .68 
.25 .25 
.063 .063 
5.71 5.43 
.16 .16 
.21 .21 
1.64 1.64 
.0044 .0048 
.91 .83 
ED, PER45, UR, PMAN, and PSERV are percentages expressed in decimal form (i.e., .67 is 
67%). PICAP and BPR are in thousands of 1972 dollars. STAXR and IAR are straight 
percentages. 
These audit rates exclude some audits conducted at the IRS Regional Service Centers. 
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TABLE4 
Reduced Form Audit Equation 1 •2 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
CONSTANT 13.479 
ED 0.522 
PER45 -5.994 
UR --0.318 
PI CAP --0.078 
PMAN -1.537 
PSERV 1.174 
STAXR --0.017 
TIME --0.134 
BPR 152.2 
Number of Observations 450. 
Corrected R2 0.75 
t -Statistic 
16.9 
1.7 
-4.6 
--0.5 
-3.0 
-4.4 
2.4 
-0.5 
-25.1 
9.9 
Notes: (1) Sample is based on the 50 U.S. states over the 9 year period from 1980-1988. 
(2) Estimated model is based on a random effect specification of the error term. 
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TABLE 5 
Sample Statistics for Variables in Duration Model1
Variable 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
UR 0.070 0.074 0.097 0.095 0.074 0.072 0.070 0.062 0.062 
PI CAP 5.03 5.13 5.07 5.15 5.42 5.39 5.59 5.60 5.33 
PST AX -0.0071 0.033 0.018 0.067 0.229 0.053 0.022 -0.044 -0.040 
IAR<2l 1.58 1.47 1.34 1.29 1.15 1.09 0.92 0.83 0.77 
Notes: (1) Based on a subset of 40 states which have a significant state tax program. States 
excluded are: Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 
(2) These audit rates exclude some audits conducted at the IRS Regional Service Centers. 
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TABLE 6 
Amnesty Program Participation Waiting Time 
Calendar Based Fiscal Based 
State Duration Duration 
Alabama 4 4 
Alaska no state income tax 
Arkansas 7 7 
Arizona 2 3 
California 4 5 
Colorado 5 5 
Connecticut trivial state income tax 
Delaware 9 9 
Florida no state income tax 
Georgia 9 9 
Hawaii 9 9 
Idaho 3 3 
lliinois 1 2 
Indiana 9 9 
Iowa 6 6 
Kansas 4 4 
Kentucky 8 8 
Louisiana 5 6 
Maine 9 9 
Maryland 7 7 
Massachusetts 3 4 
Michigan 6 6 
Minnesota 4 4 
Mississippi 6 6 
Missouri 3 3 
Montana 9 9 
Nebraska 9 9 
Nevada no state income tax 
New Hampshire trivial state income tax 
New Jersey 7 7 
New Mexico 5 5 
New York 5 6 
North Carolina 9 9 
North Dakota 3 3 
Ohio 9 9 
Oklahoma 4 4 
Oregon 9 9 
Pennsylvania 9 9 
Rhode Island 6 7 
South Carolina 5 5 
South Dakota no state income tax 
Tennessee trivial state income tax 
Texas no state income tax 
Utah 9 9 
Vermont 9 9 
Virginia 9 9 
Washington no state income tax 
West Virginia 6 6 
Wisconsin 5 5 
Wyoming no state income tax 
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Variable 
ONE 
UR 
PI CAP 
PST AX 
IAR 
IARRES 
TABLE 7 
Duration Model for Time Waited Before 
Initiating an Amnesty1•2 
Calendar Year 
Duration 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
-1.26 -3.59 -3.80 -1.27 
(-11.79) (-3.10) (-3.25) (-12.0) 
8.73 11.05 
(1.78) (2.15) 
0.326 0.303 
(2.00) (1.85) 
0.966 0.983 
(1.81) (1.68) 
--0.115 --0.84 
(--0.40) (-1.81) 
1.41 
(1.97) 
Fiscal Year 
Duration 
Models Model 6 
-3.51 -3.75 
(-3.03) (-3.20) 
9.88 12.139 
(2.02) (2.36) 
0.343 0.325 
(2.10) (1.97) 
0.827 0.812 
(1.84) (1.75) 
--0.34 -1.075 
(-1.151) (-2.26) 
1.42 
(1.98) 
Log-Likelihood -83.446 -77.735 -75.69 -84.204 -78.057 -75.998 
Notes: (1) Based on a subset of 40 states which have a significant state tax program. States 
excluded are: Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 
(2) t-statistics in parenthesis. 
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